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Abstract
The notions of symmetry and anonymity in strategic games have
been formalized in different ways in the literature. We propose a com-
binatorial framework to analyze these notions, using group actions.
Then, the same framework is used to define partial symmetries in pay-
off matrices. With this purpose, we introduce the notion of the role a
player plays with respect to another one, and combinatorial relations
between roles are studied. Building on them, we define relations di-
rectly between players, which provide yet another characterization of
structural symmetries in the payoff matrices of strategic games.
Keywords: Symmetry, anonymity, strategic games, combinatorics, group
action
1 Introduction
Game Theory conceives complete information strategic games as interactive
decision problems in which the decision-makers know all the relevant param-
eters. A payoff matrix is a representation of such a problem. The literature
studies what a solution is and determines conditions for its existence. But
payoff matrices can be studied as purely combinatorial objects reflecting the
systems of relations involved in the formulation of their underlying interactive
decision problems.
This is precisely the goal of this work, namely to investigate some new
properties of the payoff matrices of strategic games. The main focus of this
inquiry are the different kinds of symmetries among players in such matrices.
The point of departure of our analysis is the original contribution of John
Nash [Nas51] in which he presented a formal definition of symmetric games
using permutations over the set of all actions.
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The literature extended Nash’s definition. So, for instance, Dasgupta and
Maskin provided their own characterization [DM86]. They were motivated by
the intuition that a game can be seen as symmetric if payoffs are invariant
under permutations of the identities of the players. More recently, other
notions of symmetry in games have been studied in [Ste11] and [Ham18].
Interestingly, such notion of symmetry in a game is quite analogous to
the concept of anonymity in Social Choice procedures. Both leave invariant
some elements in the representation (payoffs in games, choices in the case
of social choice functions) under some permutations of the names of the
individual agents. The group-theoretic foundations of anonymity are in many
ways related to the presentation in this paper, although they lead to results
of a different style (see for instance [Kel92], [Chi96] or [Ser99]). Further
definitions of symmetry and anonymity in games have been introduced in
the literature on Algorithmic Game Theory ([DP07], [BFH09]).
In this article, we start by proving precise connections between some of the
aforementioned definitions of symmetry and anonymity in payoff matrices.
But the central point of our study concerns the characterization of some
partial symmetries in games. To motivate this idea consider a game involving
three players in which player 1 can exchange places with player 2 without a
change in payoffs, while an exchange with player 3 leads to changes of the
payoffs. Thus, there is some sort of symmetry between players 1 and 2 that
does not hold between players 1 and 3. This example points towards a new
notion, that has not yet been treated before, namely the role that a player i
may play with respect to another one, j. By this we mean how a change in
i’s choice of actions modifies j’s payoffs independently of how the rest of the
players is affected. We define different relations comparing roles by means of
sets of equations. Depending on which set of equations we choose, we obtain
three different binary relations among roles, which we name blind, twisted
and simulation.
The blind, twisted and simulation relations defined for roles can be used
as a tool to define relations between players. Thus, we characterize whether a
pair of players can be seen as interchangeable according to the payoff matrix
of a strategic game, or whether a player can see her situation reflected in the
possible actions and outcomes of other players. The notion of role becomes
relevant in capturing the different kinds of views a player may entertain.
This paper is only concerned with symmetry-related structural properties
of payoff matrices in strategic games. The notion of roles and the relations
among them can be seen as a contribution to the system-theoretical con-
ception of games, according to which a game can be seen as a system of
interrelated objects. Thus, it is of interest to know different types of relation
holding among its components.
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1.1 Plan of the paper
Even if symmetries can be defined among the labels of strategies or among
different games, we restrict our attention here on the symmetry among play-
ers. To start the analysis, in Section 2 we introduce and compare different
definitions of symmetry (and the related concept of anonymity) present in the
literature on Game Theory. We view these symmetries in terms of the action
of the group of permutations SI (among players) on the set of all strategy
profiles and show the equivalences between some of these definitions.
In Section 3 we present an alternative characterization of symmetry in
games in terms of invariant properties under permutation. While this presen-
tation is close to other contributions in the literature, it provides a framework
for the analysis of other kinds of symmetry. Before running this study we ex-
amine the equivalence between our characterization and some of the concepts
introduced in Section 2.
Finally, in Section 4 we present the core of our analysis, by introducing
the concept of roles of player. The idea is to isolate the effects of the actions
of a single player on the payoffs of another. We present and compare three
different types of roles, blind, twisted and simulated. Then, in Section 5
we change the focus of analysis from the relations between roles to those
between players. In this new setting we detect two additional concepts of
partial symmetry among players.
Finally, Section 6 discusses briefly the meaning of these results.
2 Notions of symmetry and anonymity in the
literature
In this section we will review different notions of symmetry and the related
concept of anonymity presented in the literature on games. We prove equiv-
alences among some of them. We start by introducing some preliminary
definitions:
Definition 2.1. Let G = 〈I, {Ai}i∈I , {pii}i∈I〉 be a strategic game, where
I = {1, . . . , n} is a set of players and Ai, i ∈ I is a finite set of strategies for
each player. A strategy profile, a = (a1, . . . , an) is an element of
∏
i∈I Ai. In
turn, pii :
∏
i∈I Ai → R is player i’s payoff.
If we let A =
⋃
i∈I Ai, we can assume that all the players choose an ac-
tion from the same set A so the strategy profiles are elements of AI . We
denote with a = (a1, . . . , an) an element of A
I and with a−i the vector
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(a1, . . . , ai−1, ai+1, . . . , an). Nevertheless, we still use Ai to denote the i-th
coordinate of AI .
Definition 2.2. Sn is the group of permutations over a set of n elements.
For I = {1, 2, . . . , n}, we may also denote this group with SI . A right group
action of a group G on an arbitrary set X is an operation X × G → X
(denoted as a product) satisfying two axioms: xe = x for all x ∈ X , where e
the identity element of G, and x(gh) = (xg)h for all g, h ∈ G and all x ∈ X .
Similarly, a left action of a group on a set can be defined.
Definition 2.3. [DM86] A game G is symmetric if for any permutation
σ ∈ SI and every profile of strategies (a1, . . . , an) we have that for all i ∈ I,
pii(a1, . . . , an) = piσ(i)(aσ(1), . . . , aσ(n)). (1)
Since permutations are an important tool in this work, we analyze how
they act on profiles1:
Lemma 2.4. Let a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ A
I . The operation defined by
aσ = (a1, . . . , an)σ = (aσ(1), . . . , aσ(n))
is a right action of the group Sn over the set A
I of all profiles.
Proof. Let σ and τ be two permutations. Then for all a ∈ AI
(aσ)τ = a(στ).
To see this we calculate
(aσ)τ = (aσ(1), . . . , aσ(n))τ
We rename now aσ = b, that is, for i = 1, . . . , n, bi = aσ(i). But then
bτ(i) = aστ(i) so (aσ)τ = bτ = (bτ(1), . . . , bτ(n)) = a(στ).
Using this notation, Definition 2.3 may be restated saying that for all
i ∈ I, a ∈ AI and σ ∈ Sn,
2
pii(a) = piσ(i)(aσ). (2)
1Similar, equivalent notation and results can be found in [Ste11] and [Ham18].
2Nash [Nas51] also defines symmetric games in terms of permutations of actions, which
in turn lead to permutations of the name of players. Depending on how one interprets his
notation, this may lead either to Definition 2.3 or to our characterization (definition 3.1)
below.
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Example 2.5. Consider a game G in which I = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and A =
{s, r, t}. Consider a profile a = (a1, a2, a3, a4, a5)=(s, r, t, r, r) and a permu-
tation σ = (12) (i.e. it exchanges the names of players 1 and 2). Then, for
instance,
pi1(s, r, t, r, r) = pi1(a1, a2, a3, a4, a5) = piσ(1)(b1, b2, b3, b4, b5) =
= pi2(aσ(1), aσ(2), aσ(3), aσ(4), aσ(5)) = pi2(r, s, t, r, r).
Definition 2.6. [Par66] The commutative image of an action profile a ∈ AI
is given by #a = (#(a, a))a∈A where #(a, a) = |{i ∈ I : ai = a}|. In other
words, #(a, a) denotes the number of players playing action a in the profile
a, and #a is the vector of these numbers for all the different actions.
Example 2.7. Consider again, as in Example 2.5, a = (s, r, t, r, r). Then
#(s, (s, r, t, r, r)) = 1, #(r, (s, r, t, r, r)) = 3 and #(t, (s, r, t, r, r)) = 1. Thus,
#(s, r, t, r, r) = (1, 3, 1).
Lemma 2.8. For any a,b ∈ AI , #a = #b if and only if there exists a
permutation σ of I such that a = bσ.
Proof. Let a = (a1, a2, . . . , an). If we assume that #a = #b, then #(a1, a) =
#(a1,b) ≥ 1. We can define σ(1) to be the first index i such that bi = a1.
Proceeding in this fashion, one may construct the required permutation σ.
If a = bσ, then by definition, for every i, bσ(i) = ai, so for every a ∈ A,
{i : bσ(i) = a} = {i : ai = a}. Therefore, #(a,bσ) = |{i : bσ(i) = a}| =
#(a, a) = |{i : ai = a}| and #(bσ) = #(a).
Definition 2.9. [DP07] An anonymous game G = 〈I, A, {uik}〉 consists of
a set I = {1, ..., n} of n ≥ 2 of players, a set A of s ≥ 2 actions, and a
set of ns utility functions, where uia, with i ∈ I and a ∈ A is the utility of
player i when she plays action a, a function mapping the set of partitions
Pn−1 = {(xa)a∈A : xa ∈ N for all a ∈ A,
∑
a∈A xa = n−1} = {#a−i : a ∈ A
I}
to R.
Example 2.10. Consider again as in Example 2.5, a = (s, r, t, r, r). Since
n = 5, u3t : P5−1 → R. Here P4 = {(4, 0, 0), (3, 1, 0), . . . , (0, 1, 3), (0, 0, 4)}.
To see how the utility functions uia are related to the payoff functions
introduced above, we denote with ·i : A
I → A the i-th projection, and
we consider the map that assigns to each a ∈ AI the partition #a−i. Let
ui· : A × Pn−1 → R be the function
3 that assigns to each pair (a,#a−i) the
value uia(#a−i). Under these conditions, the following diagram commutes:
3This is equivalent (via curryfication) to saying that ui
·
: A → RPn−1 , given that
uia : Pn−1 → R.
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AI
pii //
〈·i,#−i〉

R
A× Pn−1
ui
·
::
✉
✉
✉
✉
✉
✉
✉
✉
✉
✉
The corresponding equation is
pii(a) = u
i
ai
(#a−i), (3)
which lets us obtain the functions uia given the pii, but this does not work
in the other direction. The utility functions have less information, since we
have removed the identities of the players playing each of the actions, keeping
only the number of players choosing each of the actions.
Example 2.11. Consider the case described in Example 2.10: 〈·3,#−3〉 ap-
plied on (s, r, t, r, r) yields (t, (1, 3, 0)), since a−3 = (s, r, r, r) and #−3a =
(1, 3, 0). Applying u3· on (t, (1, 3, 0)) gives u
3
t (1, 3, 0). The commutativity of
the diagram indicates then, that pi3(s, r, t, r, r) = u
3
t (1, 3, 0).
In [BFH09], the following definitions are given:
Definition 2.12. Let G = (I, A, {pii}i∈I) be a game. G is called
• anonymous when for all i ∈ I and all a,b ∈ AI , if ai = bi and #a−i =
#b−i, then pii(a) = pii(b).
• symmetric when for all i, j ∈ I and all a,b ∈ AI , if ai = bj and
#a−i = #b−j , then pii(a) = pij(b).
• self-anonymous when for all i ∈ I and all a,b ∈ AI , if #a = #b, then
pii(a) = pii(b).
• self-symmetric when for all i, j ∈ I and all a,b ∈ AI , if #a = #b, then
pii(a) = pij(b).
The two previous definitions agree on the meaning of anonymity in games:
Proposition 2.13. The definitions 2.9 and 2.12 of an anonymous game are
equivalent.
Proof. Assume that a game G is anonymous according to definition 2.9. Let
i ∈ I be fixed, and consider profiles a and b such that ai = bi and #a−i =
#b−i. Then, using equation (3) pii(a) = u
i
ai
(#a−i) = u
i
bi
(#b−i) = pii(b).
Conversely, the conditions from definition 2.12, ensure that equation (3)
defines the functions uia on Pn−1.
6
In the case of two players, Definition 2.3 captures the intuition about what
a symmetric game should be, such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma. However, for
more than 3 players, this definition sets too many restrictions, resulting in
games in which for all permutations of a given strategy profile, all players
get the same payoff. After proving this, we also prove that Definition 2.3 is
equivalent to the one of self-symmetric games from Definition 2.12.
Lemma 2.14. If n ≥ 3, then in symmetric games in the sense of Definition
2.3, for all profiles a ∈ AI , and all i, j ∈ I,
pii(a) = pij(a).
Proof. Consider a profile of strategies a. Choose some three different indexes
i, j, k. Under the permutation (i k) we have by equation (2) that pii(a) =
pik(a(i k)). In turn, under the cycle (i j) we have that
pik(a(i k)) = pik(a(i k)(i j)).
Notice that (i k)(i j) = (i j k). Finally, under the the inverse permutation
(i k j) we have that
pik(a(i j k)) = pij(a(i j k)(i k j)) = pij(a).
Thus, pii(a) = pij(a).
Proposition 2.15. A game is self-symmetric if and only if it is symmetric
as in Definition 2.3.
Proof. Assume that we have a self-symmetric game and take a ∈ AI , i ∈ I
and σ ∈ SI . Letting j be σ(i) and b = aσ, we have by Lemma 2.8 that
#a = #b, so pii(a) = pij(b) = piσ(i)(aσ).
Now assume that a game is symmetric according to Definition 2.3 and
consider i, j ∈ I, a,b ∈ AI with #a = #b. By Lemma 2.8, there exists
σ ∈ SI such that b = aσ. Then pii(a) = piσ(i)(aσ) = piσ(i)(b), and by Lemma
2.14, this is equal to pij(b).
3 Symmetry as Permutation invariance
A notion of symmetry which is better suited to our ends can be obtained by
considering that the actions of the group of permutations over payoffs and
profiles commute. To see this, first notice that we may consider the vector of
functions pi = (pi1, pi2, . . . , pin) : A
I → Rn. The group SI acts on this vector
as well, defining, as we did for action profiles, piσ = (piσ(1), piσ(2), . . . , piσ(n)).
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Definition 3.1. A game G is invariant with respect to a permutation σ if for
every strategy profile a ∈ AI we have that
piσ(a) = pi(aσ).
AI
pi //
σ

R
n
σ

AI
pi
// Rn
This means that for all i ∈ I,
piσ(i)(a1, . . . , an) = pii(aσ(1), . . . , aσ(n)).
Notice that in the right hand side of this equation, player i is playing the
action aσ(i), the same one that player σ(i) is playing in the right hand side,
and they both get the same payoff.
An equivalent equation is:4
pii(a1, . . . , an) = piσ−1(i)(aσ(1), . . . , aσ(n)) (4)
One may also consider a game that is invariant under the action of some
permutations:
Definition 3.2. A game G is invariant under the set of permutations X ⊆ SI
if it is invariant with respect to each permutation σ ∈ X .
The group action over the set of profiles determines a partition of AI in
orbits : the orbit of a strategy profile a is the set
O(a) = {b ∈ AI : b = aσ for some σ ∈ Sn}.
The orbits coincide with the sets of profiles with the same commutative
image, this is: O(a) = {b ∈ AI : #b = #a}.
Example 3.3. Consider a game with three players, with the following payoff
structure, in which each player has two actions to choose from, a, b (player 1
chooses rows, 2 columns and 3 matrices):
a
a b
a (10,10,10) (5,5,5)
b (5,5,5) (-5,-5,-5)
b
a b
a (5,5,5) (-5,-5,-5)
b (-5,-5,-5) (0,0,0)
4In [BMV17] this characterization of symmetry is presented as a fix to Definition 2.3.
[Hef17] uses an alternative characterization: pii(a1, . . . , an) = piσ(i)(aσ−1(1), . . . , aσ−1(n)).
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According to Lemma 2.14 and Proposition 2.15, this structure of payoffs un-
der S3 is self-symmetric. The orbits are {(a, a, a)}, {(a, b, a), (b, a, a), (a, a, b)},
{(b, b, a), (b, a, b), (a, b, b)}, and {(b, b, b)}. Here all the players get the same
payoff, in all the profiles of the same orbit.
Lemma 3.4. Let G be a game and τ, σ two permutations under which the
game is invariant. Then the game is invariant under their composition.
Proof. By hypothesis, for all profiles a,piσ(a) = pi(aσ). This means that for
every j, piσ(j)(a) = pij(aσ). In particular, this is true for j = τ(i) so for all i,
piστ(i)(a) = piτ(i)(aσ). Now we can write piστ(a) = piτ(aσ) = pi(aστ).
Theorem 3.5. The set of permutations under which a game is invariant
forms a group.
Proof. It is clear that every game is invariant under the identity permutation
(). Lemma 3.4 proves that the set is closed under the group multiplication.
Finally, if G is invariant under σ, since Sn is a finite group, there is some k
such that σk = (), so σ−1 = σk−1. Using Lemma 3.4, we see that σ−1 is in
the set as well.
Finally we propose a definition of symmetry as invariance under permu-
tations and prove it equivalent to the one in Definition 2.12.
Definition 3.6. A game G is symmetric if it is invariant under all the per-
mutations in SI .
Theorem 3.7. The definitions of symmetric game in 2.12 and 3.6 are equiv-
alent.
Proof. Consider a fixed permutation σ, a profile a and i ∈ I. Letting b = aσ,
and j = σ−1(i), we have that bj = aσ(j) = ai and therefore #a−i = #b−j , so
by Definition 2.12, if G is symmetric, pii(a) = pij(b) = piσ−1(i)(aσ).
Next we choose profiles a and b such that ai = bj and #a−i = #b−j .
Then we define σ(j) = i and complete the permutation so that b = aσ.
Then pij(b) = pij(aσ) = piσ(j)(a) = pii(a).
4 Roles players play
An advantage of defining symmetry in games in terms of permutations is
that we can relax some of the conditions to find more general, but still
useful, definitions. While its characterization based on commutative images
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involves a loss of information, the use of permutations allows us to keep track
of which player is playing each of the actions.
We start by isolating the effects a player’s action has over the payoffs of
another. The payoffs for a player i are given by the function pii : A
I → R.
We decompose AI as Ai × Aj × A−ij, where A−ij =
∏
k/∈{i,j}Ak. There is a
bijective correspondence between the functions from Ai×Aj×A−ij to R and
the functions from A−ij to the set of real-valued functions on Ai × Aj. We
use this correspondence to define the following notion:
Definition 4.1. Given two different players, i, j, the role that player j
plays for player i is the function rji : A−ij → R
Ai×Aj such that for all
a = (a1, . . . , ai, . . . , aj , . . . , an),
[rji (a−ij)](ai, aj) = pii(a),
where a−ij is the projection of a over A−ij .
If i = j, we define rii : A−i → R
Ai to be such that for all a ∈ AI ,
[rii(a−i)](ai) = pii(a).
If we want to determine whether the role that player j plays for player i
is somehow equivalent to the one that player l plays for player k, we need to
establish a correspondence between A−ij and A−kl. Any such correspondence
is a permutation σ of I such that σ(k) = i and σ(l) = j, but there is not a
canonical way of choosing one. Once such a permutation is chosen, we can
say that the roles are the same under this permutation if for every profile a
the payoff for player i when they play action ai and player j plays aj is the
same as the payoff for player k when they play action ai and player l plays
action aj . The equation for this is:
pii(a1, . . . , ai, . . . , aj , . . . , ak, . . . , al, . . . , an) =
pik(aσ(1), . . . , aσ(i), . . . , aσ(j), . . . , ai, . . . , aj, . . . , aσ(n)) (5)
We can write equation (5) as:
pii(ai, aj , a−ij) = pik(ai, aj, a−ijσ), (6)
or, more compactly:
pii(a) = pik(aσ). (7)
Since this holds for all a ∈ AI , we can abstract away the variables ai and
aj to express this relation between roles:
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Definition 4.2. A role rji is the same as the role r
l
k under a permutation σ
such that σ(k) = i and σ(l) = j if for every profile a ∈ AI ,
r
j
i (a−ij) = r
l
k(a−ijσ). (8)
For the case in which i = j, we write
rii(a−i) = r
k
k(a−iσ), (9)
where σ is any permutation such that σ(k) = i.
Different sets of permutations in the conditions above yield diverse sets of
equations, and therefore, different definitions of binary relations over the set
of roles in the game. First, we examine the case where we ask the condition
to hold for every acceptable permutation:
Definition 4.3. r
j
iBrr
l
k: the roles r
j
i and r
l
k are blindly related if (8) holds
for all a and σ such that σ(k) = i and σ(l) = j.
This relation is not reflexive if there are at least three players: it is easy
to give an example of a game in which three players can choose action a, b or
c and pi1((a, b, c)) 6= pi1((a, b, c)(23)) = pi1((a, c, b)), so r
1
1Brr
1
1 does not hold.
Lemma 4.4. The relation Br is symmetric and transitive.
Proof. Suppose that for all a ∈ AI and σ such that σ(k) = i and σ(l) = j,
pii(a) = pik(aσ). Let b ∈ A and τ be a permutation such that τ(i) = k and
τ(j) = l. Then τ−1 satisfies that τ−1(k) = i and τ−1(l) = j so by hypothesis,
taking a = bτ and σ = τ−1, pik(b) = pik(bττ
−1) = pii(bτ).
For transitivity, assume that rjiBrr
l
k and r
l
kBrr
t
s. Then we have that for
any a ∈ AI and σ such that σ(k) = i and σ(l) = j, pii(a) = pik(aσ), and for
any b ∈ AI and τ such that τ(s) = k and τ(t) = l, pik(b) = pis(bτ).
Now consider c ∈ AI and let γ be a permutation such that γ(s) = i and
γ(t) = j. We must factor γ as the composition of two permutations, σ and
τ satisfying the conditions above, in order to be able to use the hypothesis.
If the players k, l, s and t are different, or k = s, or t = l, or both, we let
σ = γ(k s)(l t) and τ = (l t)(k s), then σ and τ are as in the hypothesis,
with γ = στ . It follows that pii(c) = pik(cσ) = pis(cστ) = pis(cγ), so r
j
iBrr
t
s.
Notice that if one of the equalities i = j, k = l or s = t hold, then the
other two hold as well. In this case it is enough to let σ = γ(ks) and τ = (ks).
If t = k and l = s let σ = γ(lk) and τ = (lk), while if t = k but l 6= s, we
should take σ = γ(lks) and τ = (lsk).
Finally, if t 6= k and l = s let σ = γ(klt) and τ = (ktl).
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It follows from the previous Lemma that if there is a role that is blindly
related to a role rji , then r
j
i is blindly related to itself. If we recall that
for every a−ij ∈ A−ij , r
j
i (a−ij) is a function from Ai × Aj → R, we have
that for every permutation σ leaving i and j unchanged, and every a−ij , the
functions rji (a−ij)and r
j
i (a−ijσ) coincide
5. This relation holds when player i
is indifferent (or ‘blind’ with respect) to who are the players choosing all the
actions in a profile except for those from players i and j (a condition akin to
anonymity), and clearly this is not always the case. If i = j, this indifference
extends to all players other than i.
Furthermore, if we have that rjiBrr
l
k, then both roles share this charac-
teristic and their functions rji (a−ij) and r
l
k(a−klσ) agree for all σ such that
σ(k) = j and σ(l) = j.
Another consequence of rjiBrr
l
k is that for all a−ij and b−kl that are
permutations of each other, rji (a−ij) = r
l
k(b−kl).
Now we examine the case in which there is just one permutation under
which the roles are the same:
Definition 4.5. r
j
iTrr
l
k: the roles r
j
i and r
l
k are twistedly related if there
exists σ such that σ(k) = i and σ(l) = j, verifying that (8) holds for all a.
Here the existing permutation σ prescribes how to ‘twist’ the elements in
a profile a in such a way that the function rji (a) on Ai × Aj is the same as
the function rlk(aσ) on Ak × Al, acting as a translation between the points
of view of players i and k.
Lemma 4.6. The relation Tr is reflexive, symmetric and transitive.
Proof. Reflexivity is immediate using the identity permutation.
Symmetry: Suppose that rjiTrr
l
k, that is, that there exists σ such that
σ(k) = i and σ(l) = j, and for all a, pii(a) = pik(aσ). Then there exists a
permutation, namely σ−1, such that σ−1(i) = k and σ−1(j) = l, and for all
a, pik(a) = pik(aσ
−1σ) = pii(aσ
−1), so rlkTrr
j
i .
Transitivity: Suppose that rjiTrr
l
k and r
l
kTrr
t
s. Then there is a permuta-
tion σ such that for every a ∈ AI , σ(k) = i, σ(l) = j, and pii(a) = pik(aσ).
At the same time, there is a τ such that for every b ∈ AI , τ(s) = k, τ(t) = l,
and pik(b) = pis(bτ). Putting b = aσ we get that for each a ∈ A
I the permu-
tation στ is such that στ(s) = i, στ(t) = j and pii(a) = pik(aσ) = pik(b) =
pis(bτ) = pis(aστ).
5Alternatively, we can say that the role rji is invariant under the subgroup of permu-
tations that leave i and j fixed.
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Finally, we consider the case in which the existing permutation depends
on each profile:
Definition 4.7. r
j
iMrr
l
k: the role r
j
i simulates role r
l
k if for each a ∈ A
there exists σa such that σa(k) = i, σa(l) = j, and [r
j
i (a−ij)](ai, aj) =
[rlk(a−ijσa)](ai, aj). If we write b = aσa, then the previous equation be-
comes [rji (a−ij)](ai, aj) = [r
l
k(b−kl)](bk, bl), given that bk = aσ(k) = ai and
bl = aj .
Notice that here the roles rji and r
l
k are not equal under a single permuta-
tion. Instead, there is a map that for each profile a ∈ A yields a permutation
σa such that pii(a) = pik(aσa). We can think of this map as establishing a
relation of ‘simulation’ between the roles rji and r
l
k in a different way for each
particular profile.
It is clear that considering the permutation σa to be the identity for every
profile a, we can show that the relation Mr is reflexive. On the other hand,
Mr ensures that the range of r
j
i becomes a subset of that of r
l
k, but the
converse is not true:
Example 4.8. To see that the relationMr is not symmetric consider a game
with four players and set of actions {a, b, c, d} in which all the payoffs for all
players are zero except for pi2(a, b, c, d) = 1. We check that r
2
1Mrr
1
2. The
only permutations such that σ(1) = 2 and σ(2) = 1 are (12) and (12)(34).
Since the only profiles that could yield (a, b, c, d) under these permutations
are (b, a, c, d) and (b, a, d, c) it will be enough to show an appropriate σ for
each of those two profiles. We assign (12)(34) to (b, a, c, d) and (12) to
(b, a, d, c) so that pi1(b, a, c, d) = pi2((b, a, c, d)(12)(34)) = pi2(a, b, d, c) = 0
and pi1(b, a, d, c) = pi2((b, a, d, c)(12)) = pi2(a, b, d, c) = 0.
On the other hand, r12Mrr
2
1 is not the case, since (a, b, c, d)(12)(34) =
(b, a, d, c) and (a, b, c, d)(12) = (b, a, c, d), so for both permutations pi2(a, b, c, d) =
1 6= pi1((a, b, c, d)σ) = 0.
Lemma 4.9. The relation Mr is transitive.
Proof. Suppose that rjiMrr
l
k and r
l
kMrr
t
s. Then for each a ∈ A there is a
permutation σa such that σa(k) = i, σa(l) = j, and pii(a) = pik(aσa), while for
each b ∈ A there is a τb such that τb(s) = k, τb(t) = l, and pik(b) = pis(bτb).
Putting b = aσa we get that for each a ∈ A the permutation σaτb is such
that σaτb(s) = i, σaτb(t) = j and pii(a) = pik(aσa) = pik(b) = pis(bτb) =
pis(aσaτb).
Lemma 4.10. The relations defined above are ordered by inclusion: Br ⊆
Tr ⊆Mr.
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Proof. Suppose that rjiBrr
l
k. Then any single permutation σ such that σ(l) =
j and σ(k) = i is enough to show that rjiTrr
l
k.
If we now assume rjiTrr
l
k, then letting σa be the permutation σ in the
definition of Tr for all a ∈ A, we prove that r
j
iMrr
l
k.
5 Relations among players
The previous section presented the notion of roles and some relations among
them, but now we want to shift the focus to relations among players. We
will define relations between players i and j based on the relations their roles
r
j
i and r
i
j have to each other. So, building on the concepts of blindly related,
twistedly related and simulation between roles, we will define the notions of
blindly related, twistedly related and simulating players, along with a new
one of rigidly related players. This allows us to describe some of the possible
situations of interdependence of players i and j in the game.
Definition 5.1. Two players i, j are blindly related in a game G, (denoted
by iBj) if rjiBrr
i
j .
In other words, the roles rji and r
i
j of players i and j are the same under
any permutation that exchanges their places. For every permutation σ such
that σ(i) = j and σ(j) = i and for every profile a, pii(a) = pij(aσ).
Lemma 5.2. In a game with at least four different players, i, j, k, and l, if
iBj and jBk hold, then so does iBk.
Proof. The hypotheses iBj and jBk imply that for every profile a and every
permutation σ such that σ(i) = j and σ(j) = i, pii(a) = pij(aσ), and for
every profile b and every permutation τ such that τ(j) = k and τ(k) = j,
pij(b) = pik(bτ).
Given a profile a and a permutation µ such that µ(i) = k and µ(k) = i,
let us consider two cases. In the first one, we assume µ(j) = l 6= j. Now
we can factor µ = στ , where σ = (l k)(i j) and τ = (i j)(l k)µ satisfy that
σ(i) = j, σ(j) = i, τ(j) = k, and τ(k) = j. Then
pii(a) = pij(aσ) = pik(aστ) = pik(aµ).
so iBk holds.
In the case in which µ(j) = j, we cannot get such a straightforward
factorization. We write µ = γ(i k) where γ is a permutation that leaves i, j
and k invariant and consider the permutations: τ1 = (j k)(i l), σ1 = (i j),
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σ2 = (i j)(k l), τ2 = (j k), and σ3 = γ(i j). We can check that σs(i) = j,
σs(j) = i, τt(j) = k, and τt(k) = j for s = 1, 2, 3 and t = 1, 2.
We compute the composition:
σ3τ1τ2σ2σ1τ1 = γ(i j)(j k)(i l)(j k)(i j)(k l)(i j)(j k)(i l) =
γ(i j)(i l)(k l)(j k)(i l) = γ(i k) = µ.
Using the hypothesis, and the fact that by Lemma 4.4 the relation Br
is symmetric, we get for any a ∈ AI : pii(a) = pij(aσ3) = pik(aσ3τ1) =
pij(aσ3τ1τ2) = pii(aσ3τ1τ2σ2) = pij(aσ3τ1τ2σ2σ1) = pik(aσ3τ1τ2σ2σ1τ1) = pik(aµ).
Example 5.3. The transitivity of the relation B does not hold if n = 3. To
see this, consider a game G with three players and action set {a, b, c}. All
the payoffs other than the ones indicated below are zero.
G
profile (a,b,c) (a,c,b) (b,a,c) (b,c,a) (c,a,b) (c,b,a)
payoffs (0,1,2) (3,2,1) (1,0,4) (5,4,0) (2,3,5) (4,5,3)
Here 1B2 and 2B3 hold, but 1B3 does not, since pi1((a, b, c)) = 0 and
pi3((a, b, c)(1 3)) = pi3((c, b, a)) = 3. This example also shows that B is
not reflexive, since pi1((a, b, c)) = 0 and pi1((a, b, c)(2 3)) = pi1((a, c, b)) = 3
so 1B1 does not hold.
From the definition of B and the symmetry of Br (Lemma 4.4), it follows
that B is symmetric.
Using the relation B of blindly related players, we can present new char-
acterizations of the notions of symmetric and anonymous games.
Lemma 5.4. A game is anonymous if and only if for every player i ∈ I,
iBi holds.
Proof. Assume that a game is anonymous, so for every i ∈ I and profiles a
and b, if ai = bi and #a−i = #b−i then pii(a) = pii(b). To prove that iBi we
need to prove that if σ is such that σ(i) = i then pii(a) = pii(aσ). It is enough
to consider any such σ and define b = aσ. Then ai = bi and #a−i = #b−i
so pii(a) = pii(b) = pii(aσ) holds.
If we assume that iBi and a,b are profiles such that ai = bi and #a−i =
#b−i then there exists a permutation σ such that σ(i) = i and b = aσ, so
pii(a) = pii(aσ) = pii(b).
Lemma 5.5. A game is symmetric if and only if for every player i, j ∈ I,
iBj holds.
15
Proof. The proof is similar to the previous one. In one direction, if ai = bj
and #a−i = #b−j and σ is such that σ(i) = j and σ(j) = i, define b = aσ.
Then ai = bj and #a−i = #b−j so pii(a) = pij(b) = pii(aσ) holds.
In the other direction, if iBj and a,b are profiles such that ai = bj and
#a−i = #b−j then there exists a permutation σ such that σ(i) = j, σ(j) = i,
and b = aσ, so pii(a) = pii(aσ) = pii(b).
Definition 5.6. Two players i, j are twistedly related (denoted by iTj) if
r
j
iTrr
i
j .
Players i and j are twistedly related if there exists at least one permu-
tation under which the roles rji and r
i
j are the same. That is, there exists
a permutation σ such that σ(i) = j and σ(j) = i and for every profile a,
pii(a) = pij(aσ).
It follows easily from the corresponding properties for the relation Tr
from Lemma 4.6 that T is reflexive and symmetric. In general, it is not
transitive as the following example shows:
Example 5.7. We define a game with four players and set of actions A =
{a, b, c, d}. We assume that the payoff for all players in all the profiles not
indicated below are zero, so that the equations involving those profiles are
trivially satisfied.
profile (a,b,c,d) (a,c,b,d) (c,a,b,d) (c,b,a,d) (b,c,a,d) (b,a,c,d)
payoffs (1,2,3,0) (4,3,2,0) (3,4,5,0) (6,5,4,0) (5,6,1,0) (2,1,6,0)
In this game 1T2 and 2T3 are satisfied, but 1T3 is not: the permuta-
tions that could realize the relation are (13) and (13)(24), but we have that
pi1((a, b, c, d) = 1 6= pi3((a, b, c, d)(13)) = pi3((c, b, a, d)) = 4 and pi1((a, b, c, d)) =
1 6= pi3((a, b, c, d)(13)(24)) = pi3((c, d, a, b)) = 0.
Definition 5.8. Player i simulates the situation of player j (iMj) if rjiMrr
i
j.
When this is the case, for every profile a, there exists a permutation σa
such that σa(i) = j and σa(j) = i and
pii(a) = pij(aσa) (10)
The relation M is reflexive, as follows easily from Mr being reflexive.
Lemma 5.9. For games with 2 or 3 players, the relation M is symmetric,
but this condition fails for games with 4 or more players.
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Proof. For 2 or 3 players, if i 6= j and iMj, then there is a single permutation,
σ = (ij) such that σ(i) = j and σ(j) = i, so for every profile a, σa = (ij).
So, if for every profile a, pii(a) = pij(a(ij)), then we also get that for every
profile b, pij(b) = pij(b(ij)(ij)) = pii(b(ij)) so jMi.
To see that the relation M is not symmetric if there are four or more
players, we consider the game from example 4.8. There we have that 1M2
holds but 2M1 does not.
The relation M is not transitive either, as can be seen by noticing that
Example 5.7 applies to M as well.
To these conditions obtained from the corresponding ones for roles, we
add:
Definition 5.10. Two players i, j are rigidly related (denoted with iRj) if
for every profile a,
pii(a) = pij(a(ij)). (11)
This can be interpreted as saying that the places of players i and j in
the game matrix are interchangeable while the actions of the others remain
fixed. This relation is clearly reflexive, using the identity permutation, and
symmetric: for all a ∈ AI , pij(a) = pij(a(ij)(ij)) = pii(a(ij)). Example 5.3
shows also that the relation R is not transitive, since in a game with three
players, the only permutation that one need to use to verify the relation iBj
is (ij), so in that example 1R2 and 2R3 hold, but 1R3 does not. Given that
with the relation R, only permutations of the form (ij) are used, adding
more players does not change the fact that R is not transitive.
While this relation is weaker than B, when it holds for every pair of
players, it is enough to guarantee the symmetry of the game.
Lemma 5.11. If in a game G, iRj is satisfied for all i, j ∈ I, then iBj is
also satisfied for all i, j ∈ I. Therefore, the game is symmetric.
Proof. Let i and j be fixed elements of I, and σ a permutation such that
σ(i) = j and σ(j) = i. We can write σ as the composition of disjoint cycles,
one of which is the transposition (ij) (see [Hun80]). Furthermore, we assume
for the moment that σ = τ(ij) where τ is a cycle (x1x2 . . . xk) disjoint from
(ij).
Since (x1x2 . . . xk) = (ix1)(x1x2) . . . (xki), and using the condition R1
accordingly in each step we get that
pii(a) = pix1(a(ix1)) = pix2(a(ix1)(x1x2)) = . . .
= pixk(a(ix1)(x1x2) . . . (xk−1xk)) = pii(a(x1x2 . . . xk)) = pij(aσ)
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It is clear that if σ has more disjoint cycles, they can be dealt with in the
same fashion.
For a given game G, the inclusion between these relations is summarized
as follows:
Proposition 5.12. B ⊆ R ⊆ T ⊆M
Proof. Suppose that given i, j ∈ I, iBj is the case. Then every permutation
σ such that σ(i) = j and σ(j) = i satisfies pii(a) = pij(aσ). In particular so
does σ = (ij). This expression is just equation (11), so iRj is satisfied. We
have also proved that there exists one permutation σ, namely (ij), for which
(11) is satisfied, meaning that iTj is also the case. Finally, if iTj is the case,
we can take for every profile a, σa = σ and we have:
pii(a) = pij(aσ) = pij(aσa)
meaning that iMj is the case.
To see that these relations are different, consider the following examples:
Example 5.13. We define below some games with four players in which each
one can choose either action a or action b. We will assume that the payoff for
all players in all the profiles not indicated below are zero (except for the case
of G′′′), so that the equations involving those profiles are trivially satisfied.
A star will indicate that a payoff can take any value, and those values need
not be all the same at all the occurrences of ∗. The players 1 and 2 are in
different kinds of relations:
G
profile (a,a,a,b) (a,a,b,a) (a,b,a,b) (b,a,a,b)
payoffs (1,2,*,*) (2,1,*,*) (3,4,*,*) (4,3,*,*)
In the game G above 1M2 is satisfied, but 1T2 is not, since the permu-
tations that realize the relation are different for the profiles (a, b, a, b) and
(a, a, a, b). More precisely, σ(a,b,a,b) = (12) and σ(a,a,a,b) = (12)(34).
(a,b,a,b) (a,b,b,a) (b,a,a,b) (b,a,b,a)
G′ (1,2,*,*) (3,4,*,*) (4,3,*,*) (2,1,*,*)
G′′ (1,2,*,*) (3,4,*,*) (2,1,*,*) (4,3,*,*)
G′′′ (1,2,*,*) (1,2,*,*) (2,1,*,*) (2,1,*,*)
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In the game G′, 1T2 is satisfied, but not 1R2, since the permutation
used is (12)(34). In G′′, 1R2 is satisfied, but 1B2 is not. If that were the
case, using σ = (12)(34) the equation pi1(a, b, a, b) = pi2(b, a, b, a) would yield.
Finally, the game G′′′ illustrates that more identities need to be satisfied for
1B2 to hold, including some that involve profiles not in the table.
There are further ways in which the situations of two players may be
regarded as similar or equivalent. We might want to compare not just the
roles of i and j relative to each other, but also to find a way to match the
role of each player relative to i with one of the roles relative to j. So for X
equal to each of B, T and M we define two new relations. In the first one,
the matching is given by a permutation:
Definition 5.14. Players i and j are in the relation PX (iPXj) if there exists
a permutation τ such that τ(i) = j and for all k ∈ I, rkiXrr
τ(k)
j .
Relaxing the condition on the matching we obtain:
Definition 5.15. Players i and j are in the relation QX (iQXj) if riiXrr
j
j
and for all k 6= i there is an l 6= j such that rkiXrr
l
j.
It is clear that PB ⊆ PT ⊆ PM and QB ⊆ QT ⊆ QM, while PX ⊆ QX
for X equal to B,T and M. Inspecting the definitions more carefully reveals
that for example iPBj if and only if there exists σ such that σ(j) = i and
for all a ∈ A, pii(a) = pij(aσ)). It follows that T ⊆ P
B.
Similarly, iQBj means that for all a ∈ A and σ such that σ(j) = i,
pii(a) = pij(aσ)). The rest of the definitions seem rather cumbersome and
don’t seem to have intuitive appeal.
6 Discussion
In this paper we presented different definitions of symmetric games from the
literature, framing them under a combinatorial view to clarify their relations
to each other. This approach, given in terms of the group action of the
group of permutations of the names of the players over the set of all strategic
profiles, allows us the definition of symmetric game as invariance under these
permutations. Such a definition can be easily found in a reinterpretation of
the definition in [Nas51].
The definition of the role a player plays from the point of view of another
lets us study further structure in a game using permutations. Roles can be
compared to one another, and we have defined some different ways of doing
so. To compare two players directly, we consider the roles each one of them
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plays with respect to the other. The contingent relations between roles and
between players are diverse and present a rich behavior, as summarized in
the following table.
Relation Reflexive Symmetric Transitive
Br NO YES YES, if n ≥ 4
Lemma 4.4 Lemma 4.4
Tr YES YES YES
Lemma 4.6 Lemma 4.6 Lemma 4.6
Mr YES NO YES
Example 4.8 Lemma 4.9
B NO YES YES, if n ≥ 4
Example 5.3 Lemma 5.2 and Example 5.3
R YES YES NO
Example 5.3
T YES YES NO
Example 5.7
M YES NO, if n ≥ 4 NO
Lemma 5.9 Example 5.7
Notice that of all the relations presented, the only one that is an equiv-
alence relation is Tr. One natural question is whether taking a quotient on
the set of roles may lead to a simplification in the study of a game.
Although we give our motivations in terms of how one player may find
her situation reflected in that of other players, the equations that define
the different relations are objective and can be checked against the payoff
matrix of a strategic game. This may prove to be an important tool to
analyze strategic games, finding players in similar situations in a natural and
automatic way.
The definitions we have given emphasize the assessment that a player may
make of another, which is a natural way in which humans analyze a game,
but there is no difficulty in defining the role that a set of players plays with
respect to another set of players. Thus, if X, Y ⊆ I, we may consider the
role rYX : A−XY → R
AX×AY , where AX =
∏
i∈X Ai, and A−XY =
∏
i/∈X∪Y Ai,
in an similar way to what we did for two players.
A topic that we have not treated in this paper is that of the symmetries
among actions. Nash proposes in [Nas51] permutations over the set of ac-
tions in the game, and only then proceeds to study particular cases of those
permutations, namely those that preserve the relation among players and
actions that can be actually played by them. We avoided this complication
just by assuming the set of actions is the same for all players. But this is
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an oversimplification. For instance, in the Battle of the Sexes the set of ac-
tions is the same for both players, but only by interchanging their names
the symmetry that is apparent in the setting of the game can be formally
justified. In [Ham18], the case in which actions that have different names for
different players can be identified is considered, so the Battle of the Sexes
can be regarded as symmetrical. This label-independent approach leads to
a combinatorial classification of games according to the symmetries found in
them. A further treatment of this extension of the concept of symmetry and
a discussion of how it can contribute in finding equilibria of games can be
found in [ST18] or, in a quite different context [GKR17].
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